

Virtual and Local Representational Spaces in Sculpture: An Interpretation based on Husserl's Theory of Phantasy *

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Abstract: This paper aims to interpret and organize two types of spaces of sculptural representation, referring to Husserl's discussions on "image consciousness" and phantasy. Regarding the space of sculptural representation, we define two concepts. One concept posits that the representational space exists virtually free from the local reality of a sculpture (virtual representational space), while another proposes that it is located in real space comprising a sculpture and the beholder (local representational space). To theoretically interpret these two types of representational spaces and a state of the local representational space—which incorporates a local reality—it is helpful to refer to Husserl's theory of image consciousness and phantasy, which supports a transformation from perception to phantasy. Consequently, we conclude the following. On one hand, the virtual representational space of a sculpture is formed in a "reproductive phantasy" as a space of an "image-subject," which does not share the current bodily space of the beholder. On the other hand, the local representational space of a sculpture is formed in a "perceptual phantasy" that neutralizes the perception of the sculpture as a space of an image-subject identified with its "image-object/image-thing," which shares the current bodily space of the beholder and can reflect their concrete movements.

Keywords: sculpture, virtual representational space, local representational space, reproductive phantasy, perceptual phantasy

Introduction

When we appreciate sculptural works, we could be experiencing two types of representational spaces with objects. For example, with Michelangelo's *David* statue placed in the hall of the Accademia Gallery in Florence, we can imagine David flinging a stone at Goliath in a battlefield, thronged with soldiers. The first type of representational space is a fictional one that has no connection with the real physical space. This representational space is, as it were, an abstract space of nowhere, which is different from the museum space we enter, and is separated from the presentness of our physical space. Let us call this space "virtual representational space." In this context, "virtual" refers to the imaginary place in the mind that is not tied to the actual space where the sculpture is placed, and is positioned in the mode of *phantasy*. I will discuss the concept of sculptural representation as a kind of phantasy in the first section of this paper.

On the other hand, we sometimes superimpose the representational space of a sculpture onto its real physical space. In this case, the hall of the Accademia Gallery is imagined as the battlefield

* This paper is based on the Japanese version printed in *Bigaku* 72, No. 1 (2021): 13–24, published by the Japanese Society for Aesthetics.

where David, Goliath, and the soldiers stand. The physical space of the reality and the representational space of the sculpture are connected, and the latter appears to contain concrete movement and volume. Occasionally, we look at a kewpie doll held by a girl as if it were a baby, and we sometimes appreciate sculptures in a similar way. Let us name this type of space “local representational space.” In this context, “local” is positioned in the mode in which the phantasy as a sculptural representation incorporates the perceived reality according to its actual state, albeit as an imagined environment.

The virtual representational space does not take into account the real space in which we exist, but the local representational space takes as a subject the real space surrounding the sculpture and us. Robert Hopkins, in chapter 32 “Sculpture” of the *Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics*, highlights the locality of the representational space of the sculpture, linking “sculpture space” to “gallery space,” while “the space of the painting is distinct from gallery space” (Hopkins 2003-1, 578). However, when we appreciate sculptures, it is not easy to determine unambiguously whether we are appreciating them in a virtual or local mode; it seems important to position them appropriately. It is conceivable that the two representational spaces can be treated as the spatial consciousness of images with different horizons (the virtual mental horizon that is not located in reality and the horizon in real space).

In the first section of this paper, I will clarify the positions of virtual and local representational spaces by referring to research conducted by Susanne Langer, Hopkins, and Kendall Walton. In sections 2 and 3, I will introduce the concept of “image consciousness” proposed by Edmund Husserl, and by referring to his theory of a transformation from perception to phantasy, I will organize the relationship between virtual space and local space in sculptural representation. In particular, the problem involves questions regarding the peculiar state of the local representational space, which connects representational space to perceived real space, and I will answer these by adopting the concept of Husserl’s “perceptual phantasy.”

1. Virtual Representational Space and Local Representational Space

In this section, by referring to research involving concepts corresponding to the virtual and local representational spaces of a sculpture, I attempt to further clarify both these concepts and compare the two.

Langer can be cited as a representative who discusses a concept corresponding to the virtual representational space. Taking into account the sculptor’s point of view, she argues in her book *Feeling and Form* that a sculpture, i.e., “a virtual kinetic volume,” dominates the surrounding space in the way we organize spaces around us in everyday life.

A piece of sculpture is a center of three-dimensional space. It is a virtual kinetic volume, which dominates the surrounding space, and this environment derives all propositions and relations from it, as the actual environment does from one’s self. (Langer 1977, 91)

The three-dimensional space described here is meant to be virtual¹. Langer argues that “virtual space is the primary illusion of all plastic arts” and that “this space has no continuity with the space in which we live,” i.e., it is “entirely independent and not a local area in actual space” (Ibid., 72, 75). Furthermore, she states, “its [a statue’s] kinetic volume and the environment it creates are illusory” (Ibid., 92). In other words, the representational space of a sculpture is not the same as the real space in which the beholder is present, but is positioned as visual and “virtual space.” According to Langer, the virtual space of a sculpture differs significantly in mode from that of a painting, i.e., “a space of direct vision,” and is the space wherein the function of the sculpture “make[s] tactual space visible,” i.e., space wherein tactile data are translated into visual terms, and it belongs to a visual illusion as a “semblance” of “kinetic volume in sensory space” (Ibid., 88–90, 92).

Referring to *The Problem of Forms in Painting and Sculpture*, written by Adolf Hildebrand, Langer states that his view about the semblance of sculptural representations discussed in this book is the best commentary on her “virtual space” (Ibid., 76). Hildebrand divides the states of perception of a sculpture into two types: “visual representation (Gesichtsvorstellung)” and “kinetic representation (Bewegungsvorstellung).” The former corresponds to the representation when we look at a “distant image (Fernbild)” of a sculpture, i.e., a two-dimensional flat semblance. On the other hand, the latter is based on “a touch with hands or with eyes” performed near the object, and is positioned as a complex of multiple visual representations that are finally combined by “eye movements” (Hildebrand 1918, 19–21). The visual representation can depict a united image instead of a three-dimensional complex, whereas the kinetic representation is considered to have no unity because it progresses only successively. Hildebrand argues that a sculptor mobilizes both representations in his or her work, but the visual representation is the one that becomes the ultimate foundation for unifying forms, and foregrounds this representation (Ibid. 23–27)². The visual representation is said to contain latent kinetic representations as certain marks (bestimmte Merkmale) (Ibid., 21), but not in the form of a complex of successive representations, but as a flattened semblance. The visualized tactile data mentioned by Langer are regarded as equivalent to the latent kinetic representations described by Hildebrand, i.e., a kinetic representation transformed into a flattened semblance. Langer states that, “we have to step back, and see it [a figure] unmolested by our hands” (Langer 1977, 92), and concurs with the view corresponding to Hildebrand’s distant image. Apparently, Langer’s virtual space can correspond to Hildebrand’s visual representation.

Langer’s virtual space is characterized as the aspect that makes on the beholder the impression that it is separate from reality, and is considered an illusion (Ibid., 45–46). In this case, the illusion is treated as a phantasm, rather than as a type of illusion that is falsely believed to be real. In the case that a sculpture evokes a sense of reality in the beholder and his or her

¹ Hopkins questions whether the surrounding space of the sculpture proposed by Langer corresponds to real gallery space, but interprets it otherwise (Hopkins 2003-1, 580).

² Herbert Read disagrees with Hildebrand’s two-dimensional visual emphasis, stating that the “touch-space” of sculpture is not subsumed by the “sight-space” of painting, and emphasizes “tactile imagination” (Read 1956, 48–49). However, it seems undeniable that visual representations, which are closely related to mental representations, are positioned at the center of complex perceptions in space.

spontaneous act of representation does not intervene in it, for example, when he or she encounters a wax figure that looks just like a real person, his or her perception is of an illusion as sensory misunderstanding. On the other hand, from the perspective that a representation is caused by sculptural objects, as suggested by Langer, who states that the sculpture organizes representational space, the mental image formed in the beholder is not a spontaneous representation, and it could be considered an illusion as a phantasm because it does not actually exist. However, from the perspective of the beholder, his or her act of representing an object is not in an illusion, but is an intentional act accompanied by cognitive play. Therefore, this act could be positioned as an act of *phantasy* when the beholder believes that an object of representation is not posited in reality³. The illusion that is interpreted as being caused mainly by the object in fact involves the imaginative representation of the beholder, so I would like to deal with it in the category of phantasy. Now, if we reconsider the “virtual space” of the sculpture discussed by Langer as an imaginary space owing to the fact that it is not located in reality, then Langer’s theory could be incorporated in the concept of “virtual representational space” that I defined at the beginning of this paper. Since the virtual representational space of a sculpture does not have continuity with the space in which we live, it is reinterpreted as an imaginative representational space that is not posited in reality. Moreover, it encompasses both visual representations and visualized tactile representations.

Hopkins and Kendall Walton are representatives who discuss a concept corresponding to the local representational space. Hopkins agrees with Langer’s idea of *organized representational space*, and argues that the experience of representational space belongs to the imaginative one, not the illusionary one (Hopkins 2003-2, 282). However, he reclassifies the representational space of the sculpture that is considered virtual in Langer’s concept as local one, and gallery space is placed in its environment (Ibid.). In addition, by thinking that the beholder’s “point of view” of the organized representational space is not in the sculpted “object’s shoes,” but in the beholder’s actual body (Ibid., 281), Hopkins understands that the representational space of the sculpture is positioned to be seen from the beholder’s moving perspectives. This concept is close to that of Hildebrand’s kinetic representations. However, Hopkins does not explain the problematic state of the relationship between represented objects and actual gallery space, so this issue is left unclarified.

Walton also discusses the locality of imaginative representation in sculpture. He states that the unicorn tapestry hanging in the Metropolitan Museum of Art suggests a unicorn in a “fictional place” (corresponding to the virtual representational space), while *The Minute Man* statue in Concord, Massachusetts, USA, makes us imagine that the statue itself is a real minute man (Walton 1990, 63) (corresponding to the local representational space). This statue is located near the Old North Bridge over the Concord River, where the Battle of Concord, i.e., the beginning of the War of Independence, was fought, and it reminds us of the scene of American militia battling

³ In this paper, I treat the representation from the perspective of the beholder and define the following terms: *Illusion* is a representation of an object when the beholder believes that it is located in reality, but it is not. *Phantasy (imagination)* is an act of representation of an object when the beholder believes that it is not located in reality, regardless of whether it is or not. Finally, *perception* is the sensory act of grasping an object that is located in reality when the beholder believes that it is.

there. According to Walton, the concrete “substance” of presented objects prompts itself to be an object of imagination (Ibid., 26). However, it is also said that the statue of Constantine the Great placed on a truck does not necessarily create the fiction that Constantine is riding there (Ibid., 118), and that the classification of whether the representational space is local or virtual depends on the arrangement of props of presented objects. The interpretation that a minute man is imagined locally is not necessarily unambiguous. When we imagine the battlefield of Concord, where soldiers throng to fight with their enemy, the imaginary space seems to be a fictional one, separated from the real space. In other words, even with *The Minute Man* statue, it is possible to imagine a minute man being on a fictional battlefield of nowhere⁴ (virtual representation) in addition to imagining him being in the real place (local representation). The representational space of the sculpture that Hopkins and Walton discuss in connection with real space corresponds to the “local representational space” that I defined at the beginning of this paper. It includes visual and tactile representations, and the latter covers not only visualized representations, but also concrete perceptions of mass. Additionally, the local representational space is a place where the projections of the beholder’s abstract movements (including imaginative movements) and concrete movements develop together, and these movements can be related to the imaginative representation of the sculpture⁵.

Let us compare the virtual and local representational spaces from the perspectives of the figure, ground, horizon⁶, and relationships with the beholder’s movements. When we organize a sphere of objects to which our attention is directed, as a whole sculptural work, into figures and the ground—the figures are the sculptural objects themselves and the ground is their background environment (things, spaces, etc.)—other things and spaces lie as the outside of the focus of attention but as outer horizons with potentialities. The horizon of the virtual representational space of a sculpture has potentialities of phantasy that exist in our mind and develops to have intentionality according to the objects of representation, but has no connection with reality. On the other hand, the horizon of the local representational space of a sculpture is the actual physical space incorporated in the beholder’s bodily space. The sculpture as figures and the environment (surrounding space) as the ground are organized on this horizon, and in these figures and ground,

⁴ Although Walton finds this case less natural, he does not deny it (Walton 1990, 63).

⁵ Maurice Merleau-Ponty divides the act of the movement of the body into “the abstract movement” and “the concrete movement,” and argues that a function of the projection of the former corresponds to “motor intentionality,” which superimposes a virtual or human space on the physical space, and develops the latter (Merleau-Ponty 1945, 142, 149). In the virtual representation of a sculpture, the beholder’s abstract and concrete movements are separated from its space. However, imaginative movements of the beholder that intervene in this virtual representational space can be incorporated. On the other hand, in terms of the local representation of a sculpture, its space is a place where the beholder’s abstract and imaginative movements and represented movements of the sculpture are layered and projected. It also becomes a place where senses of touch and volume, grasped by the concrete movements of the beholder, are reflected in the representation of the sculpture.

⁶ The figure and the ground correspond to the foregrounded subject and its background, respectively, forming a single perceptual object. This object appears on a horizon that changes according to how you perceive it. Horizons, according to Husserl, are “pre-sketched potentialities” (Husserl 1950, 82). In general, the horizon contains a myriad of themes, but in the process of grasping the object, it becomes a place of the subject with a certain intentionality. The “outer horizon” always has the potential to become the figure or the ground, and vice versa. In addition, the object is composed of not only figures and the ground, but also “inner horizons.” The inner horizon is inside the object but is not manifested, and it belongs to the unfulfilled intention (unerfüllten Intentionen) (Husserl 1984, 590).

coexist inner horizons, which do not yet become visible to the eye. Inner horizons become figures or the ground according to the concrete movements of the beholder, and the objects of representation change. It can be said that representational contents are formed as an aggregation of these represented objects that change successively.

Since the virtual representational space is not a place where the beholder's current concrete movements are practiced, the projections of his or her movements in this space, which take the place of the sculpture itself or assume positions to watch its represented subjects, involve only imaginative movements. For example, we can imagine the touch of the battlefield's soil on which David steps even in the virtual representational space, but that touch remains an abstract thing that does not necessarily reflect the presence of our bodies. On the other hand, since the local representational space partially involves the surrounding real space of the sculpture, it is linked to the bodily space wherein the beholder's concrete movements develop. We can represent David in the same space our bodies inhabit, for example, in the feeling of calmness in the dome-shaped hall of the Accademia Gallery. In this case, it can be said that there is a peculiar state in which representations of the sculpture and the presence of the beholder's body are interrelated.

I have examined the two modes of representational spaces of sculptures, the virtual one and the local one, by referring to previous research. Since we experience these two modes in practice, these two need to be organized without eliminating either. In addition, the local representational space of a sculpture implies that it is continuous with the surrounding real space, i.e., the space perceived by the beholder's body, and this peculiar aspect requires further analysis. This issue will be discussed in the following sections.

2. Husserl's Image Consciousness and Representational Space of Sculpture

The placement of representational images of a sculpture in a virtual representational space or a local representational space is based on the way of phantasy⁷. For this examination, it seems useful to refer to the image theory, which treats images of perception and those of imaginative representation together, and Husserl's theory of "image consciousness (*Bildbewusstsein*)" (Husserl 1980; Husserl 2005) provides a basis for this treatment. Furthermore, Husserl's concept of "perceptual phantasy" could explain theoretically the phenomenon in which perception and phantasy are connected, and it provides important perspectives. In this section, by referring to Husserl's theory of image consciousness and phantasy, I will attempt to organize the method of grasping the representational space of a sculpture and situate its local representational space, which is a peculiar phenomenon, in this organization.

Regarding images, Husserl formulates the concept of "image consciousness," which covers the perception and the phantasy, and leaves many manuscripts for detailed analyses. He deals with not only the picture, but also the sculpture, drama, and landscape as objects of examination, stating, "The 'image' is apprehended spatially" (Husserl 2005, 581). He maintains, "*The image is not an illusion*" (Ibid.), except in cases such as images reflected in mirrors and wax figures,

⁷ Husserl uses the term "Phantasie" to indicate imagination in a broad sense that is not limited to mental images, and "Imagination" to indicate the image representation that creates mental images.

and he argues the image consciousness centering its relationship with the phantasy. Husserl classifies the images that form the objects of image consciousness into three types: physical “image-thing (Bild Ding),” “image-object (Bildobjekt),” and “image-subject (Bildsujet)” (Ibid., 20, 584; Husserl 1980, 19, 489). For example, with a gypsum bust, the image-thing is what is seen spatially in its materiality. In this moment, the form of the thing is an attribute of the material, and no specific meaning is oriented. On the other hand, the image-object is an image of shape and color that bears meaning. Its appearance is regarded as “perceptual (perzeptiv),” and the “belief (Glaube)” of the reality of the perceived object is neutralized. It is said to be in an “undecided (dahingestellt-sein-lassen)” (Husserl 1976, 248) state, i.e., a state wherein the position of its reality is suspended. We have an image-object in parallel with a perception of the gypsum thing, and the appearance of a uniformly white image of a human’s upper body causes a “conflict (Widerstreit)” with the image-thing of the gypsum bust. The image-object is not located in reality and is regarded as nothing, i.e., a mere “appearance” that is different from a physical object grasped in real space (Husserl 2005, 50, 581–586). The image exhibited in the image-object (image exhibiting) by the beholder, for example, an imagined figure of Roman general Agrippa, is an image-subject (image exhibited), and the act of phantasy is involved in its formation. For Husserl, this type of “exhibiting (Darstellung)” is the act of forming a phantasy and superimposing it on a perceptual fact (Ibid., 564, 582), and it corresponds to the representation of a work of art by the beholder. An exhibited image-subject is a product of the phantasy, and like an image-object, it lacks the position of existence. Husserl’s image consciousness has three states: perception, perceptual neutrality, and phantasy, and there are conflicts between them (Fig. 1). The conflict between the image-thing and the image-object (let us call this conflict 1) is of the kind in which the consciousness of one pushes the other. Regarding the gypsum thing and the white human figure, Husserl argues that “they cannot make two *appearances* stand out simultaneously” (Ibid., 49). On the other hand, the conflict between the image-object and the image-subject (let us call it conflict 2) is defined as “the conflict between the image-object appearance and the representation of the *subject* entwined with it or, rather, partially coinciding with it,” (Ibid., 55) and the differences between the two are finally coordinated by the overlap based on similarities⁸. Conflict 1 is exclusive, but conflict 2 is solved by an overlapped coexistence through the transition from the image-object to the image-subject. Furthermore, it can be said that there is an exclusive conflict between the image-thing and image-subject.

Husserl’s image theory is characterized by the definition of the image-object. The aspect of consciousness changes between the case in which we see clouds as usual in the sky (image-thing)

⁸ Walter Hopp argues that Richard Wollheim’s seeing-in theory, the twofold thesis of perception, which is stated in the representation of paintings, leads to the dual intuition of the image-object and the image-subject proposed by Husserl (Hopp 2017, 132). Christian Lotz also states that Husserl’s image theory is along the same lines as Wollheim’s seeing-in theory (Lotz 2007, 172). However, both interpretations are considered inappropriate. While it is true that Husserl sees the image-subject in the image-object (Husserl 1980, 474), this is not the kind of two simultaneous perceptions that Wollheim proposes (Wollheim 1998, 221). In Husserl’s case, we see the imaginatively represented subject in the image-object that is in a perceptual and neutral state. This act of seeing is not in perception, but is already in a neutrality that does not position the reality of the subject. This act is regarded as double apperception (Doppelapperzeption) (Husserl 1980, 511).

and the case in which we see shapes in clouds (image-object). In the latter case, we move away from the phenomenon of clouds and have an intentional consciousness about the meaning of its forms (when we see a living sheep [image-subject] in those shapes, the aspect changes as well). The definition of the image consciousness of forms, which lies between the physical image and the represented subject, removes ambiguity and offers a meaningful perspective when thinking about the act of depiction⁹.

Image-thing: Perception	[positing]
Image-object: Perceptual neutrality	
Image-subject: Phantasy	[non-positing]

Fig. 1 Three states of image consciousness

Husserl extends the phantasy to two types: “reproductive phantasy (reproduktive Phantasie),” i.e., product of the “neutrality-modification (Neutralitätsmodifikation)¹⁰” of a “re-presentation (Vergegenwärtigung),” and “perceptual phantasy (perzeptive Phantasie),” i.e., product of the neutrality-modification of a perception (Husserl 1976, 250; Husserl 1980, 505–506, 591¹¹). This dichotomic classification applies to the image-subject. An ordinary phantasy is called “reproductive phantasy.” The reproductive phantasy is an act of phantasy that, for example, makes us recall a centaur intuitionally, and the image-subject is represented simply in our consciousness (in this case, even if the image-subject is formed, the image-object does not necessarily appear). Alternatively, an image-subject formed in connection with an image-object such as recalling a real person in a photograph is a reproductive phantasy as well. The subject of phantasy (image-subject) is in front of us but is “as if,” and it is formed independent of reality and is not posited in reality (Cf. Husserl 2005, 606). Next, in the “perceptual phantasy,” one takes

⁹ When Ernst Gombrich looks at a landscape painting and asks, “canvas or nature” (Gombrich 1977, 24), or when Wollheim says that the consciousness of the painting comprises the double perception of its pictorial surface and represented things (Wollheim 1998, 221), the latter of each corresponds to Husserl’s image-subject, but the former of each is ambiguous in terms of whether it corresponds to Husserl’s image-thing or image-object. If Gombrich’s canvas can be thought as signifying an image-thing, it can be said that its apprehension is not simultaneously compatible with the apprehension of an image-subject, just as Husserl who said, “in the one case it is precisely perception that we have and in the other case it is phantasy” (Husserl 2005, 10). However, if we can think that Wollheim’s painting surface signifies the image-object, we can say that, in concurrence with Husserl’s concept, it is possible to grasp doubly the painting surface (image-object) and the image-subject. Therefore, by introducing the concept of the image-object, we can avoid the conflict between the views of Gombrich and Walheim.

¹⁰ Husserl explains in *Ideen zu einer reinen phänomenologie und phänomenologischen philosophie I* that the process of phantasy in general is the neutrality-modification applied to the positing act of remembering (Erinnerung) in the widest conceivable sense of the term (Husserl 1976, 250; Husserl 1931, 309). This act of remembering includes, for example, the remembering of real friends (positing) and that of nonexistent centaurs (non-positing), and a reproductive presentation of something. Husserl explains, “We are dealing now with a modification which in a certain sense completely removes and renders powerless every doxic modality to which it is related, but in a totally different way from that of negation” (Husserl 1931, 306).

¹¹ Although it is said that Husserl left a note in the margin of draft No. 20 (appendix LXIV) asking himself, “Indeed, is there perceptual phantasy?!” (Husserl 2005, 709), I proceed to the argument accepting its concept.

the image of the perceiving thing as the image-subject, but imagines it to be “just actuality as if,” and this phantasy corresponds to the act of identifying the image-subject with its image-object or image-thing (Ibid., 607) (in cases such as theatrical presentations, wherein the image-object does not appear, the subject of phantasy is identified with the perceiving thing, such as an actor). In other words, the conflict between each state of image consciousness is mediated by the imaginative unification. In this case, although the “positing (Setzung)” (Husserl 2005, 487) of the image-subject (=image-object/image-thing) is reserved, the image-subject is regarded as belonging to the space in which we are present. Husserl considers the “aesthetic attitude (ästhetische Einstellung)” (Husserl 1980, 587) a moment that causes the perceptual phantasy.

Let us take a concrete look at the representation of statues, including space. When we imagine reproductively—owing to the *David* statue—the living David about to fling a stone, the image of this phantasy is an image-subject. On the other hand, when we are conscious of the appearance of an image of the white figure of *David*, that image is an image-object. The former is in the non-positing state and separate from the horizon of the real space, and Husserl interprets this saying, “The ‘phantasy image,’ however, belongs in another world” (Husserl 2005, 182). The latter is in a state of perceptual neutrality, but shares the same horizon with perception, i.e., the real space. For the beholder, the real space is posited, whereas the surroundings of the image-object which are organized as part of “the continuity of sense contents in the field of visual sensation” (Ibid., 50), are neutralized as a perceptual intuited object, and there is a conflict between the real space and the surroundings of the image-object. However, the white human figure is there where the statue is. Husserl interprets this stating that the image exists as “a semblance” (Ibid., 180), and that the image-object “is an example of a perceptual phantasy” that “hovers before us perceptually” (Ibid., 605, 607).

In theatrical presentations, the conflict between the reality and the subject of phantasy is always in the state of “actual conflict (wirklichen Widerstreits)” (Husserl 1980, 510). In a play, when we are absorbed in the gestures and lines of the salesperson Willy Loman, we imagine non-positing scenes, but when we concentrate our reflective attention on the actor Osamu Takizawa and the stage setting, we are conscious of the real space in which we are present. Moreover, when Willy Loman’s subject is captured by the perceptual phantasy as if it were present (in this case, Willy Loman’s subject unifies with the actor), the conflict between the subject of phantasy and the actor with the real space is reconciled. In theatrical presentations, the subjects of phantasy are not necessarily limited to the sphere of pictorial forms, so perceptual phantasy works directly on actors and the stage without going through the image-object as “depictive images (Abbilder)” (Ibid., 514–515). In the case of the painting, Husserl regards the conflict between the subject and the reality as being in the state of “potential conflict (potentiellen Widerstreits)” (Ibid., 510). When we are conscious of the reality of the wall on which a painting hangs, the representational space in the painting opposes this real space. In the sculpture, the boundary between the sculpture itself and its surrounding space is ambiguous, and the conflict between them is more literal. In the painting and the sculpture, the act of representation that identifies the image-subject with the image-object is an act of perceptual phantasy, which generates the perceptual locality and compromises on the conflict with the real space.

Let us suppose that a statue of Cupid is placed on a child’s bed. When we imagine a living

Cupid by the statue, the image-subject belongs to the reproductive phantasy, and its existence is not posited in reality, so the image-subject is in the non-positing state. However, the juxtaposition of the statue and the child's bed indicates a physical contiguity in the space, so the conflict between the image-subject and the reality becomes literal. There are four possible ways of looking at the statue and the child's bed as a unit. 1: The existence of both the statue and the child's bed is realistically captured as an image-thing. In this case, the realistic consciousness in the perception drives out imaginative consciousness. 2: Imagine both Cupid and the child's bed productively. In other words, one would imagine a living Cupid with flesh and blood and a bed to fit him. In this case, the representational space is virtual and unrelated to the reality. 3: Incorporating the perceptual child's bed as it is, imagine Cupid reproductively. In this case, the reality of the child's bed is neutralized in an imaginative act, and the representational space is non-positing but located, as if it were present. 4: See the statue and the child's bed that we perceive as they are as objects of phantasy from an aesthetic outlook. This act corresponds to identifying the image-subject with the image-object, and the representational space obtains the perceptual locality. When we come in contact with an abstract sculpture placed outdoors, we sometimes appreciate, with an aesthetic attitude, the shapes and colors of the sculpture and its surroundings exactly as it is (but in fact, we imagine it as if it were). This act of representation is situated as a phantasy and treated as a perceptual phantasy by Husserl. The depicted image-subject appears as the image-object of the sculpture in the *perception* and it is actually located, but its representational space is non-positing.

The surroundings of a sculpture are real, i.e., they possess the physical spaces in which we are present as a horizon, but the extent to which these surroundings are thematized in a representational space depends on those desired by a representational image and on the intention of the beholder. A virtual representational space that does not necessarily consider the real spaces surrounding a sculpture is created on a virtual horizon by depicting the reproductive imaginings for the sculpture and the imaginary surroundings required by its dynamic volume. On the other hand, surroundings in a local representational space appear by neutralizing the real space through the perceptual phantasy. These surroundings appear as if they were present. As Hopkins argues, the representational space of sculptures can be connected to the surrounding real space (gallery space), but the integrated space is not posited in reality and is situated in a state of perceptual neutrality.

It can be said that there are three cases of image-subjects of a sculpture, including its surroundings (Fig. 2). Regarding the sculpture itself, there are two. These are the case (1) wherein a reproductive image-subject is formed and the case (2) wherein an image-subject is identified with its image-object in a perceptual phantasy. Similarly, there are two cases of representational surroundings: One is formed by a reproductive phantasy and the other incorporates the real surroundings as perceptually imagined. The former, placed in the virtual representational space, is isolated from the reality, while the latter, in the local representational space, is not posited in the reality but is actually located. Finally, we can think of three cases: Case (A), wherein both the sculpture and its surroundings are imagined reproductively, Case (B), wherein the sculpture is reproductively imagined and its surroundings are perceptually imagined, incorporating its real surroundings, and Case (C), wherein both the sculpture and its surroundings are perceptually

imagined as they are. Furthermore, it is possible to imagine the sculpture perceptually and its surroundings reproductively, but, in this case, with the transition of the horizon from the real space to the virtual representational space, the object imagined is considered reproductively, not perceptual, which should be included in Case (A).




Fig. 2 Three cases of image-subjects of a sculpture

3. Local Representational Space by Perceptual Phantasy

The positioning of the local representational space was argued in the previous section, but in this section, I would like to examine the mode of its representation in greater detail. In drafts No. 18 (1918) and No. 20 (1921/1924), which deal with perceptual phantasy, Husserl provides examples of everyday landscapes and theatrical presentations, and foregrounds the aesthetic attitude as a moment for perceptual phantasy. The drafts also cover paintings and sculptures, and it can be interpreted that the perceptual phantasy is also within the scope of sculptures. Let us look at the paragraph dealing with an everyday landscape.

when we contemplate a beautiful landscape aesthetically, and the landscape and even all of the human beings, houses, and villages that we see in our experience of it are “accepted” by us as if they were mere *figures in a painted landscape*. We are, of course, actually experiencing, but we are not in the attitude of actual experience; we do not actually join in the experience positing. The reality changes into reality-as-if for us, changes into “play”; the objects turn into aesthetic semblance: into mere—though perceptual—phantasy objects (Husserl 2005, 615)

When a landscape that lies on the horizon of general cognition is transformed into signifying figures by an aesthetic moment, we can interpret that the landscape is neutralized as a phantasy, even though it appears to be perceived. By the perceptual phantasy, the landscape as an image-thing is transformed into an image-object that a beholder identifies with its image-subject. In this case, in which the landscape means aesthetic figures, unlike the case of theatrical presentations, the appearance of a subjectified landscape can be considered an image-object as a depictive image. Husserl suggests that everyday objects of cognition exist as a horizon that possesses infinite themes, and that our adoption of an aesthetic attitude toward them restricts the horizon (Ibid., 705). In other words, the horizon of everyday spaces is restricted to the horizon of aesthetic figures, on which figures and the ground are formed. Regarding the part of the landscape that becomes an aesthetic object, he states that it depends on “intentions aimed at the surroundings

(Umgebungsintention)” peculiar to the intuitive object (Ibid., 612). Furthermore, according to Husserl, the beholder himself or herself is, in some cases, able to place himself or herself in the image space as an imaginary object (Ibid., 556).

Let us consider the case of the local representation of the *David* statue. We can say that we are living in a world of perceptual phantasy when we appreciate, in the aesthetic attitude, the *David* statue and the space of the hall in which it is placed as we perceive it. In this case, the image-subject is identified with the image-object, and the image-thing is replaced by the image-object (=image-subject), which is perceptual and non-positing, so the subject’s locality is maintained. In the case of the *David* statue, we can imagine David in another place (virtual representational space) as its subject, but in the case of abstract sculptures such as Calder’s *Mobile* series, it can be said that the work and its surroundings are mostly locally represented as they are, and that perceptual phantasy plays a major role. The phantasy in this case performs the act of neutralizing perception, unlike the so-called phantasy, i.e., the reproductive phantasy, and the act of believing that the object is not posited in reality. This perspective leads to the concept of representation as the “make-believe” (Walton 1990, 11) that Walton proposes. However, in Walton’s work, the local representation is induced by the props of objects, whereas in Husserl’s work, the transition from perception to it is based on the aesthetic attitude, which prioritizes the perspective of the beholder.

Generally, the image-things in a tableau are two-dimensional, being separated by its frame from the surrounding three-dimensional physical image-things, and the painting’s objects are restricted. Its image-objects have their own internal space by themselves, and the conflict with the real space connected to our bodily space rarely occurs. However, the conflict is manifest in wall paintings and site-specific arts. Masaccio’s fresco, *Holy Trinity*, draws the space inside the Church of Santa Maria Novella into its representational space, while Daniel Buren’s striped collage involves the scene of the street corner and stimulates a perceptual phantasy for its surroundings. A sculpture, which appears as three-dimensional image-objects in contrast to a painting, lacks a clear boundary with the surrounding three-dimensional things, and the conflict between the representational space and the real one is more pronounced. With the real things and the spaces surrounding the image-objects of the sculpture, we are exposed to the judgment of the extent to which these things are incorporated into the representational space as image-subjects. In some cases, sculptural subjects reproductively imagined are placed in a virtual representational space, and in other cases, they are placed in a local representational space incorporating the surrounding reality. Furthermore, in another case, the reality of a sculpture, including its surroundings, is locally represented as it is as an image-subject. In general, sculptures with site-specific forms and arrangements are represented locally with surrounding spaces and things incorporated into them, but in the case of sculptures that lack such characteristics, the extent to which the real space is subjectified depends on the beholder, and it can be said that the aesthetic attitude works particularly well as an important moment. In addition, with installation works that have various styles of expression, and whose representations are similar to theatrical presentations, we can expect image-subjects to be not necessarily formed for image-objects, but directly for image-things of presented things.

The volume of the sculpture is grasped by the concrete movements of the beholder who

shares the same horizon as his or her physical space, but this volume becomes non-posed in his or her act of representation. In the local representational space of a sculpture, what is bodily experienced through the concrete movements of the beholder, i.e., the continuous current sensory changes, such as the sense of touch, dynamic volume of the sculpture and its surroundings, state of air, and state of light, including its image-objects, can be reflected as a part of what is represented through phantasy. This act of representation is accompanied by the combination and neutralization of spatial perceptions according to the movements of the beholder. Hildebrand did not make kinetic representation the sculptor's goal of expression, arguing that it cannot realize a cohesive image because it is successive. For the beholder, however, the kinetic representation is connected with the concrete perceptions that possess presence and continuity, so it has the advantage of reflecting more of a sense of reality.

Conclusion

I divided the representational space of a sculpture into virtual and local representational spaces, and tried to position them theoretically by introducing various concepts from previous research and Husserl's theory of image consciousness and phantasy. In contrast to the virtual representation of a sculpture, which stays in the abstract world, the local representation of a sculpture neutralizes and incorporates the current progressive spatial perceptions grasped by the concrete movements of the beholder, "as if they were there." In the imaginative representation of works of art, in addition to the phantasy that works without considering reality, the proposition of another phantasy that incorporates perceptions of reality, i.e., a conceptual definition of the perceptual phantasy, is considered useful for the interpretation of the locality of the representational space.

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