

From an Analytic Pragmatist: Rethinking Analytic Aesthetics *

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Abstract: This paper proposes an extended understanding of the discipline called ‘analytic aesthetics’, with reference to analytic pragmatism proposed by a prominent neo-pragmatist, R. Brandom. It is therefore argued that analytic aesthetics should be reconsidered in terms of ‘analytic pragmatist aesthetics’. N. Carroll’s philosophy of criticism is expected to offer an appropriate picture illustrating how the analytic pragmatist aesthetics can be embodied in the actual scene. Carroll argues that (1) ‘reasoned evaluation’ comprises the essential part of criticism, and that (2) ‘success value’ should be considered as more privileged than ‘reception value’. This paper assents to (1): the framework of analytic pragmatism, according to which semantics of certain aspects of natural language is understood in terms of their pragmatics, can be aptly applied into the philosophy of criticism. The claim (2), however, may be in tension with pragmatists’ theory of art. Once the pragmatist concept of experience is accepted, the privileged status of success value over reception value is no longer hard and fast: they are two sides of the same coin. This paper thus revises the philosophy of criticism and represents it as a promising illustration of analytic pragmatism implemented in the context of aesthetics independently of Carroll’s argument.

Keywords: Analytic Aesthetics, Philosophy of Criticism, Pragmatism, Brandom

1. Introduction: On Analysis

There is an activity of inquiry known as ‘analytic aesthetics’, but it is unclear what is meant by ‘analytic’. To trace the historical background, the methodology and tools of logical analysis developed by B. Russell (1872-1970) and G. E. Moore (1873-1958) contributed to the formation of early analytic philosophy, which was the driving force behind logical positivism, especially in the 1930s. For this reason, the term ‘analytic philosophy’ tends to refer to inquiry based on logical positivist attitudes. Before W. V. Quine (1908-2000) argued that the analytic/synthetic distinction can no longer be maintained (Quine 1953), it had been generally assumed that there are the synthetic, whose truth value is determined in the light of experience in the external world, and the analytic, whose meaning and logical role are determined because of its own intrinsic nature, and that the elucidation of meanings and logical roles of the analytic is analysis. By specifying the context in this way, it may be possible to clarify what ‘analysis’ means in each of fields of

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inquiry, even today.¹ What then about analytic aesthetics? It can be said that early analytic aesthetics carried out research into the application of the conceptual analysis of early analytic philosophy to fields of inquiry related to aesthetic experiences and fine arts. In the field of analytic aesthetics, attempts were made, for example, to determine the definition of the concept of ‘art’. Today, however, analytic aesthetics covers a wide range of research, including environmental aesthetics, everyday aesthetics, and experimental aesthetics that incorporates the findings of empirical sciences such as cognitive science. Due to its historical background of having developed in the UK and the USA, analytic aesthetics tends to be reminiscent of aesthetics research conducted mainly in the English-speaking world, but in fact it is difficult to characterise it positively any more.

In view of this situation, it is tempting to propose that the name ‘analytic aesthetics’ be abandoned and that it be simply called ‘aesthetics’ from now on. Nevertheless, the historical significance of the analytic tradition in philosophy is firmly established, and the significance of the name ‘analytic aesthetics’, which implies that it is an aesthetics connected to this tradition, cannot be so easily denied. This paper would like to apply to the discussion of aesthetics the doctrine of ‘analytic pragmatism’ of the philosopher R. Brandom (1950-), who attempts to reinterpret the work of analytic philosophy from the standpoint of contemporary neo-pragmatism. In doing so, this paper reconsiders the activity of analysis in aesthetics and proposes a form of analysis that can be meaningfully carried out in aesthetics in the future. In other words, this paper is an attempt to present a vision of analytic aesthetics under the attitude of ‘analytic pragmatist aesthetics’.

2. Analytic Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Criticism

As mentioned above, it is difficult to characterise analytic aesthetics in the present day in general, but R. Shusterman (1949-), who was a leading critic of analytic aesthetics in the 1980s, stated the following in an article entitled ‘Analytic Aesthetics: Retrospect and Prospect.’²

Analytic aesthetics saw itself fundamentally as a second-order discipline engaged in the clarification and critical refinement of the concepts of art and art criticism. It neither presumed to offer new manifestoes about what art should be nor revolutionary criteria about how art should be evaluated. It instead sought a more logical and systematic account of the principles of art and criticism as actually reflected in the practice of good critics. (Shusterman 1987: 118)

¹ Various philosophers have consciously asked what is meant by ‘analysis’ in analytic philosophy; the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy has an appendix to the section on ‘Analysis’, entitled ‘Conceptions of Analysis in the Analytic Philosophy’. There, the analyses of Frege (F. L. G. Frege, 1848-1925), Russell, Moore and Wittgenstein (L. Wittgenstein, 1889-1951) are described respectively, followed by ‘The Cambridge School of Analysis’, ‘Carnap [(R. Carnap, 1891-1970)] and Logical Positivism’, ‘Oxford Linguistic Philosophy’ and ‘Contemporary Analytic Philosophy’, and presents a variety of analyses in philosophy up to the present day (<https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/analysis/> (Retrieved 28 November 2023)).

² This paper (Shusterman 1987) was contributed as an introduction to a special issue of *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* on analytic aesthetics. This is therefore written with the attitude of summing up analytic aesthetics up to the time of 1987 and characterising its achievement in as general a way as possible, and in that respect it is suitable for this paper to refer to.

In short, the analytic aesthetics referred to here is an activity of a second-order inquiry, carried out in response to artistic activity and critical practice on the ground floor, and does not propose norms or make value judgments. Shusterman sees this situation problematic and argues that we should rather seek ways in which analysis of past practices and concepts can be used to improve future artistic activity and critical practice (Shusterman 1987: 121-3).³

This paper generally agrees with Shusterman's argument, but reflecting on contemporary aesthetics, his proposed policy shift seems to have been realised in Noël Carroll's 'philosophy of criticism' (Carroll 2009). This is because, although the philosophy of criticism is, as Carroll himself acknowledges, a kind of a second-order inquiry, it actually involves active claims about values and norms. In what follows, this paper provides an overview of Carroll's conception and then connects this with analytic pragmatism to propose a way of seeing analysis that will remain valid in aesthetics in the future.

The basic framework of the philosophy of criticism is characterised by two claims. (1) The essence of criticism is 'reasoned evaluation' and (2) criticism should focus on the 'success value' of a work of art rather than its 'reception value'.

Let us start with the first claim. First, while there is an evaluative discourse on artworks, there is also a non-evaluative discourse that describes the physical properties and historical background of the works. As there are evaluative discourses and non-evaluative discourses of art, the policy of distinguishing between criticism and other discourses on the basis of whether or not they include this evaluation makes a certain amount of sense (Carroll 2009: 15-18). On the other hand, a possible counterargument to the first claim is that since there is no standard of evaluation that applies to all works of art, there is no way to justify the criticism. Carroll responds that while there may not be general evaluation criteria common to all kinds of art, there can be general criteria to the extent that they provide a basis for assigning a value to a work in light of the category to which it belongs (Carroll 2009: 28- 29).⁴ There is also an argument against evaluation being 'reasoned'. According to this argument, evaluation is a subjective act that is emotive rather than cognitive and is not based on objective reasons derived from cognitive facts.⁵ Carroll's response is as follows. Emotion and cognition cannot be completely separated. Rather, many emotions (e.g. fear) are based on cognitive judgements. Therefore, even if evaluation is emotionally carried out, behind the emotion there is a cognitive process, i.e. a reasoning process

³ Thus, in this article, Shusterman argues that future analytic aesthetics should turn towards a pragmatist attitude. In Shusterman (1992), he also proposes a 'pragmatist aesthetics' following Dewey's theory of art. It would be possible for a study to question the significance of this aesthetics in relation to the neo-pragmatist thought of the time, especially that of Rorty (1931-2007), to whom he himself frequently refers (e.g. Shusterman 1997). Nevertheless, this paper does not pursue such a direction. Rorty himself expresses a hard-line anti-representationalist and anti-foundationalist attitude (Rorty 1979), so his neo-pragmatism is often regarded as an anti-analytic philosophy. This paper proposes rather to apply Brandom's attitude, which emphasises the continuity between analytic philosophy and pragmatism, to the domain of aesthetics.

⁴ In making these claims, Carroll has in mind Kendall Walton's theory of categories of art (Walton 1970); see also the discussion in Carroll (2009: ch.4).

⁵ This 'cognitive' means that it contains a propositional judgement and that it can be true or false about its content. Hence, cognitive facts here are supposed to correspond to facts of the world and are expressed propositionally (e.g. 'it is snowing'). Cognitive judgements involve propositional content and therefore involve processes using reason, such as reasoning.

(Carroll 2009: 29-32). In Carroll's conception, the various (non-evaluative) tasks performed in criticism, such as description, classification, etc., are tasks of identifying reasonably general criteria to refer to and explaining the reasons for evaluation. Thanks to these tasks, valuing is not merely a subjective judgement, but an objective judgement with some normative features. This paper would like to accept this first claim.

Let us turn to the second claim. What are the factors that make a work of art valuable? On the one hand, there is the idea that the value of a work of art is increased by the fact that the artist has achieved something with that work of art. The value thus increased is called 'success value'. On the other hand, there is the idea that the value of a work is increased by the creation of a valuable experience on the part of the recipient. The value thus increased is called 'reception value'. Artworks can, of course, have both of these values. However, Carroll argues that it is the success value that should be given more weight in criticism (Carroll 2009: 52-65). Success value is typically considered to be increased when the work achieves what the artist intended. Carroll believes that criticism should have a generality or objectivity, and that postmodern criticism that selfishly accords reception value to works such as *Plan 9 From Outer Space* and evaluates them positively is inappropriate (Carroll 2009: 60-1). For this reason, Carroll argues, it would be more appropriate to think that the emphasis should be on the success value that can be explained by the artist's intention and other facts that seem objectively supportable, rather than the reception value that seems to depend on the subjective experience on the part of the recipient.

Since this paper attempts to link the philosophy of criticism with analytic pragmatism, it would like to raise one concern that can be assumed on the pragmatist side. Generally speaking, pragmatists explain an object by focusing on what experience the object produces. When several hypotheses are put forward about the object, pragmatists examine the validity of the hypotheses in the light of experience. Applying this spirit to the case of a work of art, the value of the work of art depends on the kind of experience it generates. This seems rather compatible with the idea of placing emphasis on reception value. Indeed, the art theory advocated by John Dewey (1859-1952), one of the foremost pragmatists, defined a work of art as an experience (Dewey 2005 [1934]). If this is the case, Carroll's position, which emphasises success value over reception value, may be in tension with pragmatism. This point is discussed again in Section 4.

3. Analytic Pragmatism

Analytic philosophy and pragmatism are often regarded as contrasting streams of thought.⁶ In recent days, however, there have been a number of attempts to recount the history of Anglophone philosophy, focusing on the continuity between pragmatism and early analytic

⁶ One of the main reasons for this situation can be attributed to the campaign that Rorty developed from the 1970s to argue for a revival of pragmatism. He characterised pragmatism and analytic philosophy as contrasting (Rorty 1979). Misak (Cheryl Misak, 1961-), a contemporary pragmatist who does not hide her dissatisfaction with Rorty's characterisation, states as follows. "Rorty brought it[pragmatism] back, but in a resolutely anti-analytic version, a version despised by the ruling philosophical class. The idea is that pragmatism is set against analytic philosophy and has suffered from challenging this wrong-dead but domineering winner of the philosophical stakes." (Misak 2013: 1)

philosophy and the close interaction that existed between the two.⁷ This paper focuses on Brandom's analytic pragmatism, which attempts to salvage the common project of analytic philosophy and pragmatism (Brandom 2008).

First, Brandom characterises analytic philosophy as follows. "I [Brandom] think of analytic philosophy as having as its center a concern with semantic relations between what I will call 'vocabularies' "(Brandom 2008: 1). Vocabularies refer here to the various kinds of language used in different discursive spaces. In early analytic philosophy, the semantic properties of certain expressions of natural language (e.g. modal expressions such as possibility) were explained by descriptive language structured primarily on the basis of formal logic, and explanations in such language were typically considered to correspond to 'analysis'.

Pragmatism, on the other hand, focuses on use rather than meaning. In other words, it shifts philosophical concern from semantics to pragmatics. In light of this, Brandom proposes to extend the concept of 'analysis' to focus on the relationship between use and meaning, i.e. between practice or practical abilities and vocabularies. In doing so, he introduces two kinds of relation.

[1] Practice-vocabulary (PV) sufficiency: the relation established "when engaging in a specified set of practices or exercising a specified set of abilities is sufficient for someone to count as *deploying* a specified vocabulary"(Brandom 2008: 9).

[2] Vocabulary-practice (VP) sufficiency: "the relation that holds between a vocabulary and a set of practices-or-abilities when that vocabulary is sufficient to *specify* those practices-or-abilities"(Brandom 2008: 9).




Fig.1 Pragmatic metavocabulary (based on Brandom 2008: 11)

⁷ In addition to Brandom, it is worth mentioning Misak as a contemporary pragmatist who would take a line that swings back from the hard-line anti-analytic attitude displayed by Rorty. Misak points out that the line of pragmatism from C. S. Peirce (1839-1914) to C. I. Lewis (1883-1964) and Quine is still viable in contemporary analytic philosophy, and keeps a certain distance from Rorty's neo-pragmatism (Misak 2013).

With these meaning-use relations, relations between vocabularies can be represented. If V' is a vocabulary sufficient to specify a set of practices-or-abilities P sufficient to deploy a vocabulary V , then the relationship between V and V' can be represented as in the diagram above (Fig.1). As shown in the figure, the relation between vocabularies (VV-relation) can be represented by the composition of the PV-sufficiency and VP-sufficiency. Brandom states that when the relations shown in the figure are established, “ V' is a pragmatic metavocabulary for V ”(Brandom 2008: 10).

This scheme of explaining the relation between vocabularies via the pragmatic relations of PV-sufficiency and VP-sufficiency is the most basic form of the theory proposed by Brandom as analytic pragmatism. To generalise, analytic pragmatism is an idea that, in explaining V , focuses first of all on the practices-or-abilities which deploying V is a matter of engaging in or exercising. Semantic analysis, which was the aim of early analytic philosophy, attempted to explain the meaning of particular expressions of natural language by means of a language centred on formal logic. This can also be regarded as a kind of explanation of the relation between vocabularies. However, what Brandom wants to emphasise by this scheme is that, via pragmatic relations, it becomes possible to conceive of a pragmatic metavocabulary for the vocabulary V to be analysed, which may be different from metavocabularies referred to in traditional analytic philosophy (e.g. formal language, language of physical science, language of empirical description, etc.) In other words, the work of traditional analytic philosophy can be seen as part of the consequence of analytic pragmatism to find out pragmatic metavocabularies. The (semantic) metavocabularies that have been useful in traditional analytic philosophy will continue to play an important role in fields such as logic and experimental science. At the same time, on the other hand, in the framework of analytic pragmatism, pragmatic metavocabularies have the advantage of being able to envisage the way in which analysis should be conducted when the object can be more effectively represented.

This paper proposes to see Carroll’s philosophy of criticism as an activity of analysis in this broad sense, or in other words, of conceiving a pragmatic metavocabulary. To simplify the argument, let us suppose that we are, in practice, sufficiently deploying a critical language if we are carrying out ‘reasoned evaluation’.⁸ Then the language used in criticism corresponds to V , and ‘reasoned evaluation’ to P . The next task expected in ‘analysis’ in the sense of Brandom is to elaborate a vocabulary sufficient for VP-relation to identify the practice of ‘reasoned evaluation’. While ‘reasoned evaluation’ consists in effect of ‘reasoning’ and ‘evaluation’, the argument developed in the chapter 3 of Carroll (2009), i.e. the argument to identify the consequences of each task of description, categorisation and contextualisation, is an attempt to identify the practice of ‘reasoning’. The discussion in the chapter 4 of Carroll (2009) attempts to identify the practice of ‘evaluation’. In this light, a language that states a evaluation which involves, for example, clarifying the classification of the artwork, adequately describing the relevant features, and stating an interpretation of the work in light of the historical context in

⁸ In this paper, this is only posited for convenience. As discussed in Section 5 of this paper, what practices and abilities are considered to be involved in the analysis is fallible and plastic, and here the norms to which the analysts are committed at the start of the analysis should also be taken into account.

which it is set, corresponds to V' . The language V used in criticism is thus described by the pragmatic metavocabulary V' .

This paper would like to suggest that Carroll's philosophy of criticism can thus be seen as an application of analytic pragmatism. The idea behind analytic pragmatism is that 'the practices of making claims and giving and asking for reasons' (Brandom 2008: 43) are at the heart of language practice, and from this position Brandom constructs his theory of inferentialism. The practice of 'reasoned evaluation', on which the philosophy of criticism focuses, corresponds precisely to the practice of giving and asking for reasons. Furthermore, by stating that "normative vocabulary codifying rules of inference is a *pragmatic metavocabulary* for modal vocabulary" (Brandom 2008: 101), Brandom proposes that modal expressions, traditionally seen as a subject of representative semantic analysis, are explained via pragmatics as involving norms about reasoning theory, and proposes to account for them via pragmatics. This way of explanation also accords with a philosophy of criticism that explains critical practice as a normative practice of evaluation.⁹

4. The Pragmatist Concept of Experience

What would be the effect of reinterpreting the philosophy of criticism under the scheme of analytic pragmatism as described above? The discussion in the previous section focuses on the argument in the philosophy of criticism that the essence of criticism is 'reasoned evaluation'. On the other hand, as discussed in Section 2, the philosophy of criticism includes the argument that success value should be more important than reception value. This paper focuses on the pragmatist concept of experience, which Brandom embraces, and offers a different view from Carroll's on the latter point. This view, however, does not undermine Carroll's position. Rather, by adopting this view and the scheme of analytic pragmatism, the philosophy of criticism comes to provide a good example of what analysis could be in the future. In the following two sections, the positive claims of this paper are presented.

Brandom suggests that pragmatism, which was established in New England around 1900, can be regarded as the second Enlightenment (Brandom 2011: ch.1). According to his argument, like the Enlightenment movement promoted in Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries, classical pragmatism considers reason to be the essential human capacity. These pragmatists consider that reason is "to be understood on the model provided by the form of understanding distinctive of the natural sciences"(Brandom 2011: 36). However, the European Enlightenment and pragmatism have different images of natural sciences in mind. The former took Newtonian physics as its paradigm of understanding, whereas the latter was based on Darwinian evolutionary theory and statistics. Evolutionary theory led pragmatists to believe that the capacity of reason establishes principles from situation-specific practices, just as organisms establish adaptive traits through natural selection in their environment. Statistics also enabled pragmatists to understand reason as the capacity not only to make deductions with no exceptions, but also to account for the probability of events and to generate order out of chaos. Thus, according to Brandom, the "calm

⁹ These ideas of Brandom referred to in this paragraph follow those of Sellars (W. Sellars, 1912-1989).

realm of laws” of the first Enlightenment becomes for the second a dynamic population of various habits” (Brandom 2011: 37).

The old and new Enlightenment philosophies are similar in that they both pursue knowledge based on experience, and both are a kind of empiricism. However, the concept of experience held by each of them is different. Brandom explains as follows.

The older empiricism thought of the unit of experience as self-contained, self-intimating events: episodes that constitute knowings just in virtue of their brute occurrence. [...] By contrast to this notion of experience as *Erlebnis*, the pragmatists (having learned the lesson from Hegel) conceive experience as *Erfahrung*. For them the unit of experience is a test-operate-test-exit cycle of perception, action, and further perception of the results of the action. On this model, experience is not an *input* to the process of learning. Experience *is* the process of learning: the statistical emergence by selection of behavioral variants that survive and become habits insofar as they are, in company with their fellows, adaptive in the environments in which they are successively and successfully exercised. (Brandom 2011: 39)

In other words, in pragmatism, experience is seen as a series of learning processes that establish adaptive habits, rather than a single event or sensory input that forms the basis of knowledge.

With this concept of experience in mind, let us look back at the discussion of success value and reception value. First, it is no longer necessary to sustain the dichotomy of success value and reception value. For example, when an artwork is successful because it successfully realises the artist’s intentions, pragmatists can consider that behind this there may be a series of experiences as a process of learning, in which the artist, through trial and error, has found a form of the work that appropriately demonstrates her agency. Furthermore, the experience on the part of the recipient is not simply the experience of having some impression or emotion evoked by the work. It can be seen as a kind of learning process in which the recipient, through engaging with the work, reflects on the artist’s agency and makes adaptive modifications to her own agency. Thus, adopting the pragmatist concept of experience can provide a consistent basis for evaluation that encompasses success value and reception value, with the attitude of valuing experience as a process of adaptation.¹⁰

Here, each of success value and reception value can be seen as one aspect of the experience of establishing adaptive habits of practice. Both the artist’s and the recipient’s experience can then be recognised as having an aspect of success value in the establishment of successful practice and therefore an aspect of reception value in gaining valuable experience. In other words, the proposal of this paper is to abolish the dichotomy between success value based on the work/artist’s side and reception value based on the recipient’s side, and to start to discuss the success value and reception value of experience in the pragmatist sense. However, as will be

¹⁰ Various levels of agency are assumed in the interaction between artists and recipients. This paper has in mind the chain of agency described by Gell (A. Gell, 1945-1997) (Gell 1998). Note that Carroll also refers to Gell when mentioning agency (Carroll 2009: ch.2, n.3).

discussed in the next section, even after this way of discussion of success value and reception value is accepted, it is possible to take the position that success value should still be more important than reception value. In this sense, this paper does not reject Carroll's position.

The adoption of the pragmatist concept of experience in the philosophy of criticism brings about one major advantage. The emphasis on the success value on the part of the work/artist may lead to the privileging of the artist's intentions. In other words, it is easy to come to the conclusion that critics should evaluate with reference to the artist's intentions which have already been identified. However, for example, an artist may only become aware of the expressive intent of her work after it has been exhibited and a review for the work has been published. This means that the intervention of criticism has changed the artist's self-description about the work and she has found new value in her work, or in other words, value has been created beyond the artist's original intention. Here, the positive significance of the criticism is recognised, which could not be seen from the standpoint of assigning value on the basis of the artist's intentions. The pragmatist concept of experience is useful in depicting this kind of significance of criticism. In this instance, both the artist and the critic are considered to be gaining experience as a learning process of establishing an appropriate valuing practice for the work in question. By considering criticism as valuing these experience, criticism comes to be able to take into account the value emergence of the interaction between the artist and the critic.¹¹

At the same time, the concern Carroll feels when he emphasises on success values rather than reception values can be responded to a certain extent. Carroll's concern was that reception value is unlikely to obtain objectivity and generality, and therefore likely to lead to arbitrary criticism. The pragmatist concept of experience, given its evolutionary conception, includes not only the process of conscious action of organisms, but also the environment surrounding the organisms as the subject builds up adaptive habits. Common adaptive habits are likely to be established between organisms that share to some extent the environment. Paraphrasing this in the context of art criticism, agents such as artists, critics and recipients share a discursive space related to art criticism, in which common adaptive habits are established in the form of values and norms. In this sense, values based on experience, in the pragmatist sense, may have objectivity and generality. In the light of these norms, it becomes possible to say that a certain criticism is inappropriate. In other words, it becomes possible to have a non-arbitrary discussion about the appropriateness of a criticism between agents who share an art world related to the artwork in question.

¹¹ However, it might be questioned whether this is an example of the artist realising her own intentions in creating the work, rather than the creation of new value, even if this is revealed by the criticism, and whether the work has success value because those intentions have been achieved. In fact, Carroll defends a moderate intentionalism, taking the position that anything other than the artist's preconceived intentions can be recognised as the artist's intentions (Carroll: 145-6). This paper acknowledges that such an understanding of intention is possible. However, this paper takes the position that such intentions of the artist can exist only because of the artist's experience of the process of coming into contact with criticism and learning appropriate self-description. In other words, only after accepting the idea of the success value of experience, can the success value of the work in this instance be claimed. Therefore, positive reasons for accepting the pragmatist concept of experience can be pointed out here.

5. Analytic Pragmatism and Normative Factors

Even after accepting the above arguments, it is possible to argue, as Carroll does, that we should continue to focus on success value. Adopting the pragmatist concept of experience may change the way we see the issues about success value and reception value, but it is a different matter to re-question the norm of valuing. This paper would like to emphasise that it is precisely with regard to this questioning of norms that the picture of analytic pragmatism becomes viable.

As above mentioned, this paper accepts Carroll's argument that the essence of criticism is reasoned evaluation. This means that this paper accepts the PV-sufficiency which states that if we engage in the practice of 'reasoned evaluation', we are deploying the language of criticism. However, the sufficiency of this PV-relation is not always confirmed on the basis of formal logic. It can also be a tentatively but rationally assumed sufficiency based on conventional critical practice. According to Carroll's argument, it can be accepted as reasonable to make the inclusion of evaluative requirement of the discursive practice of criticism, since some discourses on art include evaluation and some do not. The fact that evaluation is 'reasoned' is also a non-negotiable point for Carroll, who believes that criticism *should* be a general and objective practice in which the workings of reason operate. This paper also accepts these points and posits a tentative PV-sufficiency between 'reasoned evaluation' and the language of criticism.

However, depending on what is the object of analysis, it may be the case that the artist's intentions can be clearly identified and that it may be appropriate to refer to the degree to which these intentions are successful as a criterion for evaluation. In this case, the range of practices corresponding to P in the diagram would be narrower, and 'reasoned evaluation' that focuses on whether the artist's intentions are successful would be at the heart of P. The norm that the success value based on the success or failure of the artist's intention should be the central basis for evaluation is thought to be at work behind these practices.

Importantly, in analytic pragmatism, attention is paid to the pragmatic dimension of practices and abilities as a medium for analysing the object, but these practices and abilities have been established through previous adaptive learning processes and therefore carry with themselves some kind of normative factors. In other words, when we carry out this analysis and focus on practices and abilities, we become aware of and come to disclose to fellows what norms we are committed to. Analytic pragmatism therefore creates an opportunity for those engaged in the analysis to disclose the norms they have implicitly accepted. In analytic pragmatism, each inquirer carries out the analysis after undertaking a commitment to his or her own norms. Even those who engage in analyses in the same subject matter, for example, the critical discourse of an art genre, may have different norms, and they disclose these norms to each other in the pursuit of a better analysis. It thus becomes possible to realise that the practices and abilities one has been focusing on in analysis have been biased, and to modify the norms one has assumed. In this way, analytic pragmatism suggests an attitude of analysis in which the community of inquirers pursues a better analysis by bringing their own norms and, with a spirit of fallibilism, focusing on what practices and abilities provide an appropriate metavocabulary for the analysis. This paper would propose that it is such analysis that aesthetics should continue to pursue in the future.

Would such a proposal be too moderate? In a sense, this paper only presents a decent picture

of a community of inquirers. However, it can at least be said that we must be particularly aware of the situation of analytic aesthetics, which is becoming more and more inclusive of an increasingly diverse range of inquiries. Today, a great variety of analyses are conducted under the name of analytic aesthetics, each of which brings with it a variety of norms. For this reason, analytic aesthetics, while continuing the tradition of analytic philosophy, is no more able than analytic philosophy to make a systematic characterisation of the analyses it performs. Herein lies the significance of applying analytic pragmatism to aesthetics. The scheme of analytic pragmatism can be used as a framework for scholars of analytic aesthetics to self-describe the analyses they are conducting. In other words, by describing the various analyses currently being conducted, what practices and abilities they focus on, what metavocabularies they manage to provide, and what norms they undertake, each analysis can be characterised within the same framework. In this way, a basis for communication between various kinds of scholars of aesthetics can be acquired.

According to Brandom's characterisation mentioned in Section 3, analytic philosophy has been concerned with the semantic relations between vocabularies. In other words, analysis there is an account of VV-relations, which typically involves describing facts about the semantic properties of particular expressions of natural language in reductive metavocabularies. There, the language of formal logic and the language of the physical sciences are also used as central semantic metavocabularies. Brandom's proposal, however, is to extend the very notion of analysis by bringing a pragmatic metavocabulary to the VV-relations that analytic philosophy had in mind. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the consequences of such a proposal for analytic philosophy, but by applying it to analytic aesthetics, the following can be said. By extending the notion of analysis in a pragmatic way, it is possible to revitalise the notion of analysis, which has been losing substance, in an adaptive way to the increasingly diverse realities of analytic aesthetics. It can also provide a basis for plausible communication within the community of inquirers of analytic aesthetics.¹²

6. Conclusion

This paper proposes a way of analysis that analytic aesthetics should continue to follow in the future, by seeing Carroll's philosophy of criticism as an application of analytic pragmatism. The positive claims of this paper can be summarised in two points. First, by accepting the pragmatist concept of experience, success value and reception value can be seen as two aspects of the value of experience, each of which is recognised by both artists and recipients. Thus, it can now be taken into account that the intervention of criticism can result in value creation beyond the artists' intentions. However, depending on the context, a position that emphasises the success value of the work, such as Carroll's, is also acceptable. Second, analytic pragmatism provides an

¹² While there is no space here to elaborate on the details of this community of inquirers, or how it might adaptively develop, this paper agrees with the proposal of Haskins (2011) which views aesthetics as an intellectual network. According to this proposal, aesthetic inquiry is about promoting the self-organisation of holistic collaborative networks, and the evolutionary ideas of pragmatism to which this paper refers are in line with such ideas.

opportunity to draw attention to the normative dimension of inquiry. In a community of inquiry, each participant brings his or her own norms from the background of the practices he or she has developed, and each discloses those norms to each other, while welcoming their modification. In this way, the community of inquiry in analytic aesthetics is open to derive better norms and to explore better analyses, in that they can even work together with others whose background norms differ from their own ones at the start of the inquiry.

Finally, this paper would like to add a point of view that takes a step back from the previous discussion. The proposals in this paper take on Brandom's proposal to rethink the historical activity of analytic philosophy in a reflexive way. This paper, therefore, follows the attitude of analytic philosophy, whose new development is suggested by Brandom, and suggests to reinterpret it as a proposal for aesthetics. In this sense, this paper makes a claim for an analytic aesthetics in line with the historical development of the analytic tradition. If we accept this claim, the various exploratory activities of analytic aesthetics can be considered as the activities of analytic aesthetics that perform analyses proposed by the scheme of analytic pragmatism. The philosophy of criticism discussed in this paper can also be seen as one of the activities of analytic aesthetics, which, independently of Carroll's intentions, continues the analytic tradition in this sense. This paper expects that in the future, in addition to the philosophy of criticism, various other activities of analytic aesthetics, such as empirical aesthetics, will utilise the scheme of analytic pragmatism and improve self-description of the analysis they perform.

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